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Cops for  Hire: Reforming Regulation of Pr ivate 
Police in Washington State 
By Andrew Stokes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2015, some residents of Seattle, Washington believed their 
neighborhoods were experiencing a crime epidemic.1 The Seattle Police 
Department was seen as slow to respond to some crimes, including property 
crimes and drug use.2 In response, residents pooled their resources to hire 
private police3 to patrol their neighborhoods.4 The private police were seen 
as providing improved response times and more aggressive tactics: one 
group of residents in the Magnolia neighborhood claimed that “[t]he 
[public] police are not allowed to speak to anyone unless they have a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime may be afoot. Further, they must be able 
                                                 
1 See Erica C. Barnett, Magnolia Resident Pepper-Sprayed by Private Security Guard, 
THE C IS FOR CRANK (Mar. 4, 2016), https://thecisforcrank.com/2016/03/04/magnolia-
resident-pepper-sprayed-by-private-security-guard/ [https://perma.cc/F27N-BEBS]. 
2 See, e.g., David Kroman, Pepper-spraying in Magnolia puts private cops in the 
spotlight, CROSSCUT (Mar. 8, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/03/pepper-spraying-in-
magnolia-puts-private-cops-in-the-spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/KM7U-BVZ3]; Jessica 
Lee, Seattle neighborhoods hire private security amid ‘blatant lawlessness’, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/citizen-anti-crime-
movement-afoot-in-seattles-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/HU54-GTPN]. 
3 By “private police” I refer to lawful, private, for-profit services whose primary 
objectives include preventing crime, protecting property and life, and maintaining order. 
See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
49, 55 (2004). While private police have similarities with other private security 
organizations, they are distinct from vigilante groups (vigilante actions are illegal; private 
police are authorized by law) and private military organizations (military organizations 
focus on operations abroad; private police are focused on domestic policing). See id. at 
56. Because they are hired by a private actor, private police are distinct from private 
firms hired by a public police department to accomplish a traditional government 
function. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits 
of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 269–70 (2010). 
4 Lee, supra note 2. 
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to articulate this suspicion in clear language. Private [police] can interact 
with anyone at any time. Because they do not represent the Government and 
the Constitution does not apply to private [police].”5 
While this characterization of the restrictions on public police is not 
entirely accurate, the claim nonetheless contains important insights. If an 
individual or group thinks that their local police department does not 
respond quickly enough to emergency calls or does not patrol the 
neighborhood often enough, they can simply hire private police to fill in the 
gaps. Furthermore, unlike public police, whose conduct is governed by state 
and federal constitutions and rules of criminal procedure, the private police 
are not typically regulated by state and federal constitutions because they 
are not considered state actors.6 Rather, the private police “find their 
conduct governed by a hodgepodge of private contract provisions, state and 
local regulations, and tort and criminal law doctrines.”7 
However, recent events show that these regulations are not adequate to 
protect the public from abuses by the private police. In December 2015, 
residents of the Magnolia neighborhood hired the firm Central Protection 
(CP) to patrol their neighborhood.8 The CP vehicles proclaimed that they 
were “Unarmed” and CP had ostensibly been instructed that, if they 
observed “suspicious activity,” they were to immediately “contact 911, and 
maintain visual surveillance of the perpetrator until Seattle Police arrive at 
the scene.”9 
                                                 
5 Private Security Officers vs Public Law Enforcement, MAGNOLIA PATROL 
ASSOCIATION (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304231831/http://www.magnoliapatrol.org/blog/ 
[https://perma.cc/A7Z4-BU48].  
6 See Joh, supra note 3, at 95. 
7 David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (1999). 
8 MAGNOLIA PATROL ASSOCIATION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160208203841/http://www.magnoliapatrol.org/ 
[httpa://perma.cc/HU24-7TCU] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
9 Id. 
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Less than three months later, a longtime neighborhood resident who had 
recently lost his home10 was sitting in his car before his shift at a local gas 
station.11 A blue-and-white CP Hummer pulled up behind him.12 “Within 
the next five minutes or so, the officer had pepper-sprayed [the resident] in 
the face and, reportedly, knocked [his] Android phone out of his hand, 
sending the phone’s face, body, and battery scattering in different 
directions.”13 
The officer had reportedly been accused of aggressive behavior a year 
earlier,14 had been convicted of negligent driving and unlawful discharge of 
a firearm, and had pleaded guilty to one gross misdemeanor count of 
violating a no-contact order and one felony count of forgery.15 In 2010, his 
felony conviction was vacated on the grounds that it was affecting his 
opportunities to obtain licensing for employment, and in 2011 the court 
restored his right to own a gun.16 In 2013, he received his license to work as 
a private security guard.17 In 2014, while employed by a different private 
police company, he was arrested and charged with two counts of fourth-
degree assault after pepper spraying two teenagers.18 
                                                 
10 Gabriel Spitzer, Pepper Spray Skirmish Shakes Homeless Magnolia Resident’s Faith 
in His Neighborhood, KNKX 88.5FM (Jun. 11, 2016), http://knkx.org/post/pepper-spray-
skirmish-shakes-homeless-magnolia-resident-s-faith-his-neighborhood 
[httpa://perma.cc/9AHV-QH9N]. 
11 Barnett, supra note 1. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Kroman, supra note 2. 
15 Erica C. Barnett, Magnolia Guard Accused in Pepper-Spray Incident Pled Guilty to 






18 Alison Grande, Magnolia security guard previously charged with assault, KIRO 7 
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.kiro7.com/news/magnolia-security-guard-previously-
charged-with-assault/151435065[https://perma.cc/2Z45-KYDS]. 
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This incident was not the only example of inappropriate private police 
behavior in Seattle. In August 2014, a black man was walking near the 
Westlake Center mall in downtown Seattle when a person described in legal 
documents as “Shirtless White Man” accosted him.19 A private police 
officer, who was providing security guard services for the mall, arrived on 
the scene; rather than confronting “Shirtless White Man,” the officer 
pepper-sprayed the black pedestrian in the face.20 The officer reportedly 
then detained the pedestrian, in the process tearing ligaments in the 
pedestrian’s wrist, and prohibited him from washing the pepper spray out of 
his eyes.21 
These stories demonstrate that the lack of regulation surrounding the 
private police in Washington creates a significant risk to the public. The 
Washington State Legislature should improve the regulation of private 
police companies in order to ensure that private police do not infringe on 
the rights of Washington residents. Specifically, the legislature should enact 
legislation to (1) modify the existing regulatory regime to cover all private 
police in Washington while allowing local flexibility to implement 
supplemental regulations, (2) improve transparency into the private police 
industry, (3) require more thorough training for private police, and (4) make 
it easier for people harmed by the private police to receive redress. 
This article will begin by discussing the scope of the private police 
industry, both nationally and within Washington, and identifying some of 
the risks posed by that industry. It will then outline the existing regulatory 
framework for the private police, with a focus on Washington’s statutory 
and case law addressing the private police. The article will proceed to 
identify a series of reforms that should be enacted to improve the regulation 
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of the private police industry in Washington. The article will conclude by 
addressing potential critiques of the reforms proposed. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY 
AND THE RISKS IT POSES 
This section will discuss the scope of the private police industry. First, it 
will outline the size of the industry and the types of activities it undertakes. 
Second, it will identify some of the problems posed by the private police. 
These problems include private officers’ power to exercise coercive 
pressures against members of the public, particularly the most vulnerable; 
the strong incentives discouraging the private police from enforcing the 
criminal law; and the potential of the private police to undermine efforts to 
reform the public police. Third, this section will discuss why people hire the 
private police. 
A. Who Are the Private Police 
Private police provide a variety of services to their clients. They may be 
hired as security guards or bodyguards.22 They may be hired to patrol 
neighborhoods and gated communities.23 Private police clients may include 
owners of “mass private property” that is accessible to the public, such as 
housing complexes, college campuses, or shopping malls.24 Other 
businesses, such as nightclubs25 and retail establishments,26 may hire private 
police to maintain order or deter criminal activity. 
Private police have a substantial presence in the United States. According 
to some observers, there are roughly three private police officers for every 
                                                 
22 Amitai Etzioni, Reining in Private Agents, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 279, 294 
(2016).  
23 Id. at 299. 
24 Id.  
25 See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, 4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 
2013) [https://perma.cc/XJ2H-2KCV]. 
26 See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. 75234-1-I, 2016 WL 3982944, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. 
July 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2X9R-GZPR]. 
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public police officer in the U.S.27 Recent estimates show 2.7 million private 
police serving in the U.S. as of 2014.28 The amount of money spent on 
private policing is double that spent on public policing.29 The growth of 
private policing is a global trend, and has been very profitable.30 In the U.S., 
private security services are a $282 billion industry.31 
Washington follows this trend; the state has approximately 11,000 
licensed private police,32 compared to 11,411 sworn public police officers.33 
The city of Sequim, WA, has privatized its prosecutorial function.34 
Some private police are employed by companies dedicated to providing 
private police services, others are employed by other types of companies. In 
the past, most private police were employed directly by the business they 
serve; more recently, the number of officers employed by companies 
dedicated to private policing has grown.35 Sixty-one percent of private 
police are employed by a company dedicated to providing private police 
services.36 However, despite their prominence, private police officers have 
no more legal authority than an ordinary citizen to make stops, searches, or 
arrests.37 
                                                 
27 Karena Rahall, The Siren is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward 
Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 647 (2014). 
28 Etzioni, supra note 22, at 295. 
29 Joh, supra note 3, at 55. 
30 See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004). 
31 See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 295 (this measure includes spending on IT security, and 
thus does not perfectly capture the size of the private police industry). 
32 Herz, supra note 19. Washington’s regulations refer to “private security guards” rather 
than “private police.” See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.170.010–18.170.902 (1995). For the 
sake of clarity, this article will use “private police” where possible. 
33 Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 15 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M82X-XBSE] (includes both state and local personnel). 
34 Fairfax, supra note 3, at 281. 
35 Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 168–69 
(2012). 
36 Id. at 167. 
37 Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 MO. L. REV. 177, 186 
(2005). 
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B. Problems with Private Police 
The private police create several risks for people in communities where 
they are present. This section will identify three primary challenges posed 
by the private police: first, despite their lack of legal authority, private 
police are able to exert significant coercive pressures over other people; 
second, private police have strong incentives to serve their clients at the 
expense of the general public; and third, private police threaten to 
undermine efforts to reform the public police. 
1. Pr ivate Police Exercise Coercive Pressures over  Civilians 
While the private police have no more legal authority than an ordinary 
person, the work of a private police officer “routinely includes . . . depriving 
individuals of their freedom.”38 Their uniforms are designed to mimic those 
of public police and they are trained to behave like public police officers.39 
Though they have no official legal status, their dress and demeanor imply 
that they act with state authority.40 Unlike most people, private police 
officers are familiar with the rules of criminal procedure and can use them 
to their advantage.41 They can also employ private drug-sniffing dogs.42 
Private police officers regularly detain people, conduct searches, investigate 
crimes, maintain order, safeguard property, and conduct surveillance.43 
They also seize evidence, conduct pat-downs, question suspected persons, 
and arrest people.44 They are able to exercise significant coercive pressures 
over other people.45 
                                                 
38 Sean James Beaton, Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of Corporate 
Investigators on the Public Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action 
Doctrine, 26 TOURO L. REV. 593, 595 (2010). 
39 Joh, supra note 3, at 112. 
40 Boghosian, supra note 37, at 186. 
41 Joh, supra note 3, at 112. 
42 See Jeremiah K. Geffe, License to Sniff: The Need to Regulate Privately Owned Drug-
Sniffing Dogs, 19 J. OF GENDER, RACE AND JUST. 167, 168 (2016). 
43 Rushin, supra note 35, at 182; Beaton, supra note 38 at 595; Joh, supra note 3, at 50. 
44 Joh, supra note 3, at 88–89. 
45 Id. at 64–66. 
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Their lack of legal status itself facilitates their ability to coerce others; 
unlike public police, private police are not required to provide Miranda 
warnings, and any evidence they obtain is not subject to the exclusionary 
rule.46 Private police are largely free to search people without cause, detain 
them, question them without providing Miranda warnings, and then turn 
them over to the public police, along with any evidence found.47 If the 
public police were to conduct a search or seizure that violated the Fourth 
Amendment, any evidence seized may be subject to suppression.48 
However, evidence seized by the private police is not subject to the 
exclusionary rule.49 This enables them to use interrogations as a 
“mechanism of social control.”50 
However, private police training is insufficient to prepare them to interact 
safely with the public. The law requires private police to undergo only 
minimal training,51 and because turnover in the industry is high, companies 
typically cannot afford to spend significant resources training every new 
employee.52 While Washington law requires private police to undergo 
additional training to carry a gun, no such requirement applies to private 
police who carry Tasers or pepper spray.53 Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
private police receive little to no training regarding working with homeless 
populations and that this lack of training results in violence.54 
                                                 
46 Rushin, supra note 35, at 182. 
47 See infra Part III.A. (explaining why private police are not required to provide 
Miranda warnings.) 
48 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
49 See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, 4 (Wash. App. Mar. 7, 
2013). 
50 Rushin, supra note 35, at 182. 
51 See infra Part IV.C. (explaining the inadequacy of Washington’s private police 
training standards.) 
52 See Boghosian, supra note 37, at 1279. 
53 See WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995). 
54 See Evan Allen & Nicole Dungca, TD Garden Cuts Ties with Firm Accused of 
Beatings, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/25/garden-severs-ties-with-firm-accused-
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In contrast, public police are typically required to undergo much more 
extensive training;55 in Washington this consists of 720 hours of basic 
training.56 This training is associated with increased professionalism among 
public police forces.57 
2. Pr ivate Police Have Strong Incentives to Serve Their  Clients Rather  
than Enforcing the Law 
Private police have strong incentives discouraging them from reporting 
criminal activity to the police, assisting with prosecution, or otherwise 
helping enforce the criminal law.58 If private police encounter criminal 
activity, they have powerful incentives to simply push that behavior away 
from their client’s property, rather than calling the public police.59 First, 
reporting the crime to the public police may require the private police to 
detain suspects, make statements, and testify in any future trial, all of which 
could lead to higher costs to the customer.60 Second, some clients may 
instruct the private police not to pursue a criminal conviction due to a belief 
that the public criminal justice system is too punitive, too lenient, or 
otherwise ineffective.61 Third, even if the client instructs private police to 
report suspicious activity and aid in prosecution, officers may have an 
incentive to under-report crime in order to meet contractual or performance 
                                                                                                       
homeless-beatings/6g9d1CbJ1QlKZWlLTxOZSN/story.html [https://perma.cc/Z92G-
HD8E]. 
55 See Rushin, supra note 35, at 197; Joh, supra note 3, at 191–92. 
56 WASH. ST. CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COMMISSION: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY, 
https://fortress.wa.gov/cjtc/www/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&
Itemid=103 [https://perma.cc/6N9Y-LP9Y] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). Private police are 
required to undergo only 16 hours of training and four hours of annual refresher training. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007).  
57 Rushin, supra note 35, at 191. 
58 See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 925 
(2007). 
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 937–38. 
61 See, e.g., id. at 924–47. 
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objectives.62 Fourth, private police have a profit motive to avoid enforcing 
the criminal law: by pushing criminal activity away, private police can 
increase the demand for their services in any areas that see a resulting spike 
in crime.63 Private police advertising has attempted to fuel fears about crime 
in order to boost demand for their services.64 Fifth, even if the private police 
were otherwise inclined to report criminal activity, the risk of losing 
business creates an overwhelming incentive not to report crimes when they 
are committed by clients.65 Thus, private police who encounter criminal 
activity have a strong incentive to simply push the activity away from their 
customer’s property rather than attempting to prevent its occurrence. 
The mandate to serve the customer comes at a cost to the public. If 
private police are paid, not to stop criminal activity, but simply to move it 
away from their clients’ property, those areas that are not privately policed 
may bear the burden of increased criminal activity. The impact will be felt 
most heavily in economically disadvantaged areas whose residents are 
unable to afford the services of private police.66 
Empirical evidence supports the notion that the private police do not 
consistently turn criminal suspects over to the public police for 
prosecution.67 Indeed, a Facebook page purportedly belonging to the private 
police officer reportedly involved in the Westlake Mall incident featured a 
post saying, “I’m not going to ‘arrest’ you, I am just going to throw your ass 
on the ground, handcuff you, drag you through the mall to the Security 
Office with the help of my uniformed buddies… Screw arresting! Detaining 
is way more fun! :D.”68 
                                                 
62 See Rahall, supra note 27, at 666. 
63 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1224. 
64 Id. at 1223. 
65 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 285–86. 
66 See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299 (noting that use of private police services is higher 
in areas marked by economic inequality). 
67 See Simmons, supra note 58, at 938–39. 
68 Herz, supra note 19. 
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3. Pr ivate Police Undermine Effor ts to Regulate the Public Police 
The ease with which people can hire private police to undertake activities 
that the public police cannot or will not has significant implications for 
efforts to regulate the conduct of the public police. Because public police 
are subject to institutional controls, such as oversight from elected officials 
or a desire to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, they have 
incentives to cooperate with efforts to reform their conduct.69 No similar 
concerns govern the conduct of the private police; they report only to their 
clients.70 
The lax regulation of the private police may render ineffective reforms 
designed to curb abusive public police conduct and may undermine the 
legitimacy of the public police. Regulations that apply to the public police 
only rarely apply to the private police.71 This regulatory discrepancy creates 
an incentive for private police to undertake activities that public police are 
prohibited from undertaking.72 A jurisdiction that enacts reforms to prevent 
public police from using excessive force or engaging in racial profiling 
cannot be confident that those practices will be eliminated; they may simply 
shift from public to private police. Public police in such a jurisdiction can 
still take advantage of the prohibited tactics: they can simply wait for the 
private police to act and then take advantage of any evidence obtained.73 
Even if the public police do not take advantage of this opportunity, the 
similarity between public and private police uniforms74 may cause the 
                                                 
69 See Simmons, supra note 58, at 926–27. See also Etzioni, supra note 22, at 296–97 
(other institutional constraints on the public police include: internal affairs units, civilian 
review boards, independent state- or local-level commissions, and Department of Justice 
oversight; while these institutions do not eliminate all public police abuses, similar 
restrictions are completely absent from the private police). 
70 Rushin, supra note 35, at 176. 
71 See infra Part III.A (explaining that the provisions of law that govern public police—
including the Constitution and rules of criminal procedure—do not generally govern the 
conduct of private police).  
72 See Joh, supra note 3, at 116. 
73 Id. at 115–16. 
74  Boghosian, supra note 37, at 181.  
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public to believe that the public police are still engaged in prohibited 
behavior. 
Concern about the effect private police have on public police reform is 
particularly salient in Washington. In 2011, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) identified a pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force by the 
Seattle Police Department (SPD).75 In response, the City and DOJ entered 
into a “consent decree” in order to reform the SPD and reduce improper use 
of force by public police.76 While the reform efforts have made significant 
progress, there are still instances of excessive use of force, and it is unclear 
whether the reforms have eliminated discriminatory policing practices.77 
Lax regulation of the private police creates the risk that public police will 
circumvent the new regulations or that the public will distrust the public 
police reforms. 
C. Why Do the Private Police Exist 
Most observers attribute the growth of the private police industry to the 
perception that the public police are unable or unwilling to provide the 
types of policing services that civilians desire.78 In recent years, city and 
state budgets have declined, and those governments have been unable to 
maintain the level of public police funding that some people expect.79 
Reductions in funding may decrease the frequency of public police patrols 
or reduce their response times, especially to non-emergency situations. A 
                                                 





77 See id. at 9–10. 
78 See, e.g., Cooper J. Strickland, Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Response to 
Private Policing in United States v. Day, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1338, 1338 (2011); Fairfax, 
supra note 3, at 274; Joh, supra note 3, at 67–68; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1194; see 
also, id. at 1221–24 (rebutting alternative explanations of the growth of the private police 
industry). 
79 Rahall, supra note 27, at 659–60. 
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belief that the public police are not doing an adequate job of preventing 
crime will create a gap that private police firms will be eager to fill.80 
Indeed, Seattle residents have cited increased drug and property crime, 
inadequate response times to 911 calls, and infrequent public police patrols 
as justifications for hiring private police.81 
The availability of private police creates a disincentive for richer 
neighborhoods to invest in public police funding. People with the resources 
to hire private police may push for lower taxes, confident that the private 
police can fulfill their policing needs.82 While this reduces the quality of 
police services for the community as a whole, richer neighborhoods can 
offset any decline by hiring private police.83 Indeed, studies have shown a 
correlation between economic inequality and reliance on private police.84 
Additionally, many people turn to the private police because of 
dissatisfaction with how the public police operate. Someone who believes 
that the public criminal justice system is unduly punitive and ineffective 
may hire private police and instruct them to work to rehabilitate offenders 
or integrate them into the community, rather than turning them over to the 
public police.85 However, some of the demand for private police has been 
driven by a desire to keep homeless people or people of color out of certain 
residential areas.86 Unlike the public police, who may be barred by law from 
undertaking such activities, the private police operate under a much less 
restrictive regulatory framework.87 Studies have suggested that perceptions 
                                                 
80 Id. at 671. 
81 See Lee, supra note 2. 
82 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1283–84. 
83 Id.  
84 See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299. 
85 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 57, at 913–17. 
86 Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1224 –25. 
87 See infra Part III (explaining the lax regulatory framework governing the private 
police). 
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of a “racial threat” explain the presence of private police better than high 
crime rates.88 
III. EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURES ARE INADEQUATE TO 
PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM ABUSES BY THE PRIVATE POLICE 
This section will address the current legal frameworks governing the 
conduct of the private police. It will begin by reviewing the federal legal 
scheme with a focus on whether private police are subject to the 
constitutional provisions that govern the public police. It will then discuss 
Washington State regulations on the private police, focusing on the extent 
to which Washington courts have considered the private police subject to 
constitutional constraints and the statutory licensing scheme that serves as 
the primary body of law governing the private police in Washington. 
A. Federal Regulations on the Conduct of the Private Police Are Virtually 
Non-Existent 
The federal legal authorities governing the conduct of the public police 
do not apply to the private police because they are not considered state 
actors. Generally, public police conduct is regulated by civil rights laws 
such as § 1983,89 the Fourth,90 Fifth,91 Sixth,92 and Fourteenth93 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the exclusionary rule,94 and the 
                                                 
88 Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a civil suit against any person who “under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” deprives another person of “any rights, 
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures). 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. V (protection against self-incrimination; due process). 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to speedy and public trials; right to confront witnesses; 
right to counsel). 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (extending the Bill of Rights to the states; guarantee of due 
process). 
94 “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (extending rule that barred admission of such evidence in federal criminal trials). 
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Miranda95 requirement. However, these regulations only apply to state 
actors.96 When determining whether an entity is a state actor, a court 
examines whether that entity relies on government assistance or benefits or 
performs traditional governmental functions, as well as whether the injury 
caused is uniquely aggravated by governmental authority.97 While some 
legal scholars believe that, under these factors, the private police should be 
considered state actors, courts have consistently refused to consider private 
police as state actors, thus leaving them un-governed by the provisions of 
law that generally govern the public police.98 
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed whether actors 
similar to the private police can be considered state actors.99 However, in 
both of those cases, the private actor was acting with some element of 
official state authority: Williams v. United States concerned a private 
detective who was certified as a special police officer and flashed his badge 
while interrogating a suspect;100 Griffin v. Maryland addressed a private 
security guard who had been deputized as a county sheriff, wore his 
sheriff’s badge, and identified himself as a deputy sheriff.101 The Court later 
clarified that these decisions do not govern private police, writing that 
Griffin “sheds no light on the constitutional status of private police forces, 
and we express no opinion here.”102 Lower courts are thus left with little 
guidance as to how to resolve the constitutional status of the private 
police.103 
                                                 
95 Requiring that a suspect be advised of her rights to remain silent and to have 
assistance of counsel before a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
478–79 (1966). 
96 Joh, supra note 3, at 94. 
97 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991). 
98 Joh, supra note 3, at 95. 
99 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 
(1964). 
100 Williams, 341 U.S. at 98–99. 
101 Griffin, 378 U.S. at 132–35. 
102 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978). 
103 Joh, supra note 3, at 101; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1236–39. 
576 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The result is that lower federal and state courts have generally considered 
private police to be private actors not subject to constitutional constraint.104 
Courts have followed the Supreme Court’s focus on whether the state has 
vested a private police officer with a formal title or authority.105 Incidental 
state involvement in the actions of the private police is not sufficient to 
convert them into state actors.106 Thus, the Constitution generally does not 
govern the conduct of the private police; protections like the prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule, and the 
requirement for Miranda warnings are not applicable when a person 
interacts with the private police. 
There is very little federal legislation that directly addresses the private 
police. The most notable federal statute that addresses the private police 
prohibits the federal government and the government of the District of 
Columbia from employing the Pinkerton police or a similar agency, but this 
is rarely invoked.107 
B. Washington State Law Does Not Adequately Regulate the Private Police 
Washington law does not adequately govern the conduct of the private 
police. This section will discuss three aspects of Washington law that touch 
on the conduct of the private police. First, state courts do not consider the 
private police to be state actors. Second, the Washington State 
Constitution’s stronger protection against search and seizure only applies to 
state actors. Third, Washington’s statutory licensing scheme for private 
police is inadequate. 
                                                 
104 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1239–44. 
105 Id. at 1244–46. 
106 Joh, supra note 3, at 92. 
107 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (1966). See Joh, supra note 3, at 93. 
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1. Washington Cour ts Do Not Consider  the Pr ivate Police to be State 
Actors 
Like to the United States Supreme Court, Washington courts do not 
generally consider private police to be state actors; thus, they are not subject 
to the constitutional rules that constrain the public police. While the United 
States Supreme Court has not provided guidance as to when private police 
should be considered state actors, state courts have discretion to conduct 
their own state actor analyses.108 Lower Washington courts have 
consistently found private actors, working without encouragement or 
support from the state, to be non-state actors.109 One court noted that “it is 
well established that private security guards are not transformed into state 
                                                 
108 Indeed, some have argued that the correct application of existing Supreme Court 
precedent would require a finding that private police are state actors. See Joh, supra note 
3, at 95. 
109 See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. 75234-1-I, 2016 WL 3982944, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. 
July 25, 2016) (finding that a Wal-Mart loss prevention manager who questioned a 
shoplifting suspect pursuant to company policy was not a state agent); State v. Garcia, 
No. 59925-9-I, 2008 WL 2955881, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2008) (finding that a 
bail recovery agent is not a state actor because he was not employed by the state and his 
contractual authority to seize a particular fugitive was not legal authority to enforce 
criminal law); Barbu v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 53494-7-I, 2004 WL 2526672, at *3 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004) (finding that Rite Aid security guards were not “transformed into 
state actors” when they detained a suspected shoplifter and worked with responding 
police officers to process the arrest paperwork); State v. Walter, 833 P.2d 440, 443 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no state action when developer of photographic negatives 
brought evidence of a crime to police); State v. Ludvik, 698 P.2d 1064, 1067-68 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a state game agent who saw evidence of criminal activity 
near his home and took no action other than reporting it to the police was not acting in his 
official capacity and thus his report was not attributable to a state actor); State v. 
Gonzales, 604 P.2d 168, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that a security guard, as a 
private citizen, is not a state actor); State v. Sweet, 596 P.2d 1080, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1979) (finding that evidence obtained by airline employees who were not acting as 
agents of, or in concert with, law enforcement authorities was not subject to the 
exclusionary rule); State v. Agee, 522 P.2d 1084, 1087–88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) 
(finding that the fact that a person had been a paid police informant in the past did not 
convert him into a government actor). 
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actors . . . merely because they detain and investigate shoplifters before 
turning them over to the police.”110  
While the Washington Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the 
question of when actors like the private police are considered state actors, 
an analysis of its decisions in this area suggest that it will only consider a 
private police officer to be a state actor when the officer is vested with legal 
authority to investigate violations of the criminal law and a reasonable 
person would believe the actor possessed state authority. 
State v. Heritage concerned two bicycle-mounted security officers in a 
park in downtown Spokane.111 “Both officers wore shorts and white t-shirts 
with an emblem of a badge emblazoned with the words ‘Security Officer.’ 
They also carried a ‘duty bag’ containing a radio, pepper spray, handcuffs, 
and a collapsible baton.”112 They were employed by the city and their 
responsibilities included patrolling for unlawful activities.113 They observed 
several teenagers they suspected of smoking marijuana, approached them, 
and questioned them without providing Miranda warnings.114 One teenager 
admitted possession of a marijuana pipe, was convicted of possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and appealed, arguing that the security officers were 
state actors and that their questioning thus violated the Miranda rule.115 The 
court found that the guards’ appearance, including a duty belt with 
handcuffs and a t-shirt identifying them as park security, would have caused 
a reasonable observer to believe they were acting with state authority.116 
Because they were also employed by the city and were acting in their 
                                                 
110 Barbu v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 53494-7-I, 2004 WL 2526672, at *3 (Wash. App. Nov. 
8, 2004). 
111 State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345, 346 (Wash. 2004). 




116 Id. at 348. 
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official capacity to investigate suspected criminal activity, the court 
concluded that the officers were state actors.117  
Another Washington Supreme Court case concerning a search by a 
private actor clarified that the state and federal constitutions only regulate 
searches by state actors. In State v. Eisfeldt, a repairman was called to a 
home and, while completing the repairs, noticed what he believed to be 
evidence of marijuana growing.118 He called the police and let them into the 
home, where they also saw the evidence.119 At this point, the police stopped 
their search and obtained a search warrant.120 When they executed the 
warrant, they found evidence of an active marijuana-growing operation and 
arrested the defendant.121 The defendant sought to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the search, alleging that the initial, warrantless, search with 
the repairman was a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Washington State 
Constitution.122 While the court overturned the conviction, it did so based 
on a finding that the initial, warrantless, police search of the home was a 
violation of the Washington Constitution. 123 The court clarified that Article 
I, Section 7, only regulates searches by state actors.124 
Indeed, Eisfeldt has been interpreted narrowly. In State v. Chavez, the 
court of appeals declined to grant a motion to exclude evidence obtained by 
a private search.125 In that case, a security guard at a nightclub searched the 
defendant when he entered the club and found cocaine.126 The defendant 
                                                 
117 Id. 





123 Id. at 587. 
124 Id. at 585 (noting that “article I, section 7 provides greater protection from state action 
than does the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)). 
125 State v. Chavez, No. 299619, 2013 WL 868201, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2013). 
126 Id. at *1 
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was handcuffed and police were called.127 When the police arrived, the 
nightclub staff turned over the cocaine and the defendant was arrested.128 
The defendant attempted to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the private 
search was analogous to the illegal search in Eisfeldt.129 The court 
disagreed, noting that Eisfeldt’s conviction was overturned based on an 
illegal search by the public police.130 In contrast, the cocaine in this case 
was given to the police by the nightclub; the police did not actually search 
the defendant.131 Since there was no warrantless search by a state actor, 
there was no violation of Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington State 
Constitution.132 
A recent case further demonstrated that the Washington Supreme Court is 
unlikely to consider a quasi-private actor to be a state actor.133 In State v. 
K.L.B, the defendant was riding on Seattle’s Link light-rail system when a 
Fare Enforcement Officer (FEO) requested proof of fare payment.134 The 
FEOs are employed by a private police company, which has a contract to 
provide fare enforcement services on the light-rail, but the FEOs are 
empowered to issue citations for civil infractions, such as a failure to pay a 
fare.135 They wear a uniform with patches saying “Sound Transit,” 
“security,” and “fare enforcement,” and wear a tool belt with a radio and 
handcuffs, but do not carry a weapon.136 When the defendant was unable to 
provide a valid proof of fare payment, the FEO asked him for 
                                                 
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 See id. at *4.  
130 Id.  
131Id.  
132 Id.  
133 See State v. K.L.B., 328 P.3d 886, 887 (Wash. 2014) (considering whether private 
actors were “public servants” under a statute that made it a crime to give a false or 
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identification.137 The defendant gave the FEO a false name.138 Public police 
were called, and when the defendant told them his true name, he was 
charged with making a false or misleading statement to a public servant.139 
The court vacated the charges on the ground that the FEOs were not public 
officers.140 The court reasoned that even though the FEOs have limited 
authority granted by statute, they are not “vested with some sovereign 
power of government” and do not exercise the powers that ordinary public 
police officers do.141 While this case addressed, not whether the private 
police were state actors for constitutional purposes, but whether the private 
police fit a statutory definition of a “public servant,” it suggests that the 
court is unlikely to consider a private police officer working for a non-
governmental client as a state actor.142 
In sum, the decisions by the Washington Supreme Court related to the 
private police suggest that the court will only find someone to be a state 
actor if the person is employed by the state, has authority to investigate and 
enforce the criminal law, and dresses and acts in a way that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe they act with state authority. A private police 




140 Id. at 891. 
141 Id. at 890. 
142 Cf. State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996) In Graham, two public police 
officers were armed and wearing their uniforms, but were off-duty and working as private 
security guards, when they saw a man carrying a large wad of money and what they 
believed to be cocaine. Id. at 228–29. When they attempted to arrest him, he fled, and 
when they caught him, he resisted arrest by flailing and kicking. Id. at 29. The defendant 
was charged with obstructing a public servant but argued that because the officers were 
working for a private company at the time of the arrest, they were not public servants. Id. 
at 230. The Washington Supreme Court held that though they were working for a private 
company, the officers were public servants at the time of the arrest because they “stepped 
out of their roles as private security guards and into their roles as police officers.” Id. at 
233. The court emphasized that the officers had introduced themselves as public police 
and that the defendant knew that they were public police. Id. This decision provides 
further evidence that, when drawing a line between public and private authority, the 
Washington Supreme Court focuses on the presence or absence of formal legal authority 
and the reasonable perception of state authority.  
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officer who is not acting at the behest of the state is unlikely to be 
considered a state actor. Thus, any evidence obtained by the private police 
will be admissible at trial so long as the conduct of the public police 
comports with the law. 
2. Washington’s Constitution Does Not Govern the Behavior  of Pr ivate 
Police 
Though the state constitution provides greater protection than the federal 
Constitution, it also does not apply to private actors. Article I, Section 7 of 
the Washington State Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.”143 While broadly analogous to the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, this provision has in some instances been interpreted as 
providing greater protection.144 However, this provision has only been 
applied to state actors, and thus does not restrict the activities of the private 
police.145 
3. Washington’s Statutory Licensing Scheme for  Pr ivate Police Is 
Inadequate 
The body of state law that most directly governs the private police are 
licensing statutes, however, these regulations are not sufficient to protect 
the public. Washington State governs the private police primarily through 
licensing requirements for private police companies and officers; a person 
must have a license from the state to work as a private police officer or 
operate a private police company.146 However, the licensing requirements 
                                                 
143 WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
144 See, e.g., State v. Budd, 374 P.3d 137, 140 (Wash. 2016). 
145 See State v. Eisfeldt, 185 P.3d 580, 585 (Wash. 2008).  
146 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.170.010–18.170.902. As noted earlier, the Washington 
licensing requirements refer to “private security guards” rather than “private police.” For 
the sake of clarity, this article will use “private police” where possible. Nationally, state 
statutes defining private security guards encompass the vast majority of the private police 
industry. See Rushin, supra note 35, at 186. 
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only apply to private police officers primarily employed by a private police 
company—they do not apply to private police officers employed directly by 
a retail establishment, shopping mall, or other non-police business.147 They 
also do not apply to off-duty public police officers employed by a private 
company.148 These licensing requirements apply throughout the state; 
political subdivisions such as cities and counties are prohibited from 
enacting independent regulations on private police officers or companies.149 
Performing the functions of a private police officer without a license or 
violating the restrictions outlined below is a gross misdemeanor.150 
To receive a license as an unarmed private police officer, an applicant 
must be at least eighteen years of age, be a citizen of the United States or a 
resident alien, be employed by a licensed private security company, pay a 
fee, and complete an application.151 An applicant must complete sixteen 
hours of training, though this may be reduced to eight if the applicant was 
recently employed full-time as a sworn peace officer.152 Additionally, past 
military training or experience satisfies the training requirements.153 All 
employees must undergo four hours of annual refresher training.154 
Applicants must also provide fingerprints and undergo a state-level 
                                                 
147 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020 (2015). This provision also provides that an 
employee engaged in marijuana-related transportation or delivery services on behalf of a 
common carrier must be licensed as an armed private security guard under this chapter in 
order to be authorized to carry or use a firearm while providing such services. 
148 Id. 
149 Political subdivisions are permitted only to enact general business taxes and rules that 
apply to all businesses, not just private security companies. WASH. REV. CODE § 
18.170.140 (1991). 
150 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160 (1995). 
151 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.030 (2012). 
152 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007). 
153 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.310 (2011). The statute provides an exception to this rule 
if the Director of the Department of Licensing determines that the military training or 
experience is not “substantially equivalent to the standards of this state.” Id. However, the 
statute contains no requirement that the applicant be in good standing with the military; it 
appears that somebody who had been dishonorably discharged from military service may 
nonetheless be exempt from the training requirement.  
154 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007). 
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background check.155 If the applicant has committed a crime in another 
jurisdiction, the Director of the Department of Licensing (Director) may 
withhold the license upon a determination that the particular crime directly 
relates to the applicant’s capacity to perform the duties of a public police 
officer and that the license should be withheld to protect citizens of 
Washington State.156 The authority to withhold a license is discretionary; 
there is no requirement to do so.157  
There are additional requirements for armed private police. They must be 
at least twenty-one years old and must have a current firearms certificate 
from the Criminal Justice Training Commission.158 In addition to the state 
background check, they must submit to a national criminal history records 
check.159 
To receive a license to operate a private security company, an applicant 
must meet the requirements to obtain a license as a private police officer 
and be at least twenty-one years of age.160 Owning or operating a private 
security company without a license is a gross misdemeanor.161 An owner of 
a private security company must have at least three years’ experience as a 
manager, supervisor, or administrator in the private security field or a 
related field.162 Private security companies are required to maintain general 
liability insurance coverage of at least $25,000 for bodily or personal injury 
and $25,000 for property damage.163 These companies are also required to 
notify the Director and/or local law enforcement in the event of: the death 
or termination of a licensed private security guard; the company receiving 
                                                 
155 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995). 
156 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.030(3) (2012). 
157 See id.  
158 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.040 (1991). To receive this certificate, an applicant must 
undergo at least eight hours of training. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.260 (1991). 
159 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.130(2) (1995). 
160 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.060 (1995). 
161 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160(2) (1995). 
162 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.060(1) (1995).  
163 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.080 (1991). 
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information that would affect a licensed private police officer’s continuing 
eligibility to hold a license; and any discharge of a firearm, outside of a 
shooting range, by an officer while on duty.164 Private police companies are 
also barred from using any name, sign, shield, marking, accessory, or 
insignia that indicate that the individual, business, or equipment are part of 
a public law enforcement agency.165 
The licensing regulations authorize the Director to issue punishment to 
licensed private police for unprofessional conduct.166 Punishments can 
include the revocation of the license, remedial training, or “[o]ther 
corrective action.”167 However, the disciplinary authority is purely at the 
discretion of the Director, and the Director has the authority to stay any 
action taken.168 Since 2007, none of the 11,000 licensed private police 
officers in Washington have been disciplined by the state for misconduct or 
excessive use of force.169 
4. Lawsuits by Pr ivate Citizens are an Insufficient Check on the 
Behavior  of Pr ivate Police 
Current tort remedies are an insufficient check on abuses by the private 
police. While a tort action may succeed in case of serious physical injury or 
property damage, tort actions will not succeed in regulating the day-to-day 
operations of the private police.170 First, because the damages in these cases 
                                                 
164 Notification of a death or termination must be given to the Director within 30 days of 
the event. Notification of an event affecting a guard’s continuing eligibility to hold a 
license must be given immediately to the chief local law enforcement officer. 
Notification of any discharge of a firearm must be given to local law enforcement within 
10 days. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.110 (2000). 
165 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.160(6)–(7) (1995). 
166 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.230 (1995). 
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 Herz, supra note 19 (as of 2014).  
170 See Rushin, supra note 35, at 197; Joh, supra note 3, at 126. 
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are low, they are rarely brought.171 Second, even when a person has been 
harmed, success in a lawsuit is not guaranteed.172 Third, many people do not 
have the financial resources or knowledge required to pursue a civil suit 
against a private police company or its client.173 As “repeat players” in the 
legal system, private police companies have an advantage over less 
experienced litigants, and may even see the expense of litigating and 
settling claims as a cost of doing business.174 Fourth, the actions of private 
police may be immunized from civil suit by a “shopkeeper’s privilege.”175 
Finally, whereas an illegal search by public police may result in the 
suppression of improperly-obtained evidence,176 a civil suit against the 
private police will never overturn a criminal conviction, no matter how 
egregious the behavior of the private police. 
IV. THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION 
IMPROVING REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE POLICE 
The Washington State Legislature should improve the regulation of 
private police companies in order to ensure that private police do not 
infringe on the rights of Washington residents. Specifically, the legislature 
should enact a new law that reforms the existing licensing statute so that it 
adequately regulates the private police. First, the existing law should be 
modified so that it covers all private police in the state and allows 
                                                 
171 Sharon Finegan, Watching the Watchers: The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law 
Enforcement and the Need for Limits on Neighborhood Watch Associations, 8 U. MASS. 
L. REV. 88, 128 (2013); Joh, supra note 3, at 109. 
172 See, e.g., Shabazz v. Tecton Corp., No 27572-4-II, 2003 WL 734527 (Wash. Ct. App. 
March 4, 2003) (finding no liability for apartment management company for hiring 
unlicensed security guard who pepper-sprayed apartment resident and his guests); 
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1185–86. 
173 Finegan, supra note 171, at 128; Rushin, supra note 35, at 197. 
174 Rushin, supra note 35, at 197. 
175 See, e.g., Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 P.3d 583 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.220 provides liability from civil suit if store security has 
“reasonable grounds” to detain a suspected shoplifter and any detention is done for a 
“reasonable time”); Joh, supra note 3, at 109. 
176 Finegan, supra note 171, at 128. 
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jurisdictions to enact their own supplemental reforms. Second, it should 
require increased transparency into the actions of the private police. Third, 
it should require private police to undergo more thorough training. Fourth, it 
should make it easier for people who have been harmed by private police to 
seek redress. 
The Washington State Legislature has broad authority to enact the 
suggested reform legislation. “[T]he power of the legislature to enact all 
reasonable laws is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair 
inference, it is prohibited by the state and Federal constitutions.”177 The 
proposed reforms could be accomplished by amending the existing 
licensing statutes for private police, which were initially enacted in 1991.178 
Given the pervasive use of licensing statutes to regulate businesses in 
Washington,179 it is likely that the proposed reforms would be within the 
legislature’s constitutional authority.180 
While drafting specific legislative language is outside of the scope of this 
article, the legislation must be specific and precise in order to ensure 
maximum effectiveness. Regulations that are vague create room for 
inconsistent implementation by the organizations they regulate.181 Because 
private police are motivated by profit, they are likely to interpret ambiguous 
regulations in a way that maximizes profit, not public safety.182 They may 
                                                 
177Clark v. Dwyer, 353 P.2d 941, 945 (Wash. 1960) (the decision further nots that, when 
a statute’s validity is challenged, it is presumed constitutional and that “[w]here possible, 
it will be presumed that the legislature has affirmatively determined any special facts 
requisite to the validity of the enactment, even though no legislative finding of fact 
appears in the statute.”). 
178 S.B. 5124, 52nd Leg., 1991 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1991). 
179 WASH. REV. CODE Title 18 contains licensing statutes for 93 different types of 
businesses or professions. 
180 See also WASH. CONST. art II, § 35. (“The legislature shall pass necessary laws for the 
protection of persons working in . . . employments dangerous to life or deleterious to 
health.”). 
181 Rushin, supra note 35, at 198–99. 
182 Id. at 199. 
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even attempt to evade regulation in order to better serve their clients.183 In 
contrast, due to their need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
and the various oversight regimes they are subject to, public police may 
have a stronger incentive to adhere to the spirit of ambiguous statutes.184 
This section will identify four proposed legislative reforms: first, 
modifying existing regulations to cover all private police and allow local 
flexibility; second, promoting transparency of private police operations; 
third, requiring more rigorous training for private police officers; and 
fourth, improving access to remedies for citizens harmed by private police. 
This section will close by addressing potential criticisms of the proposed 
reforms and noting shortcomings in alternative reform proposals. 
A. Expand the Scope of Existing Regulations and Allow Local Flexibility 
The legislature should modify the existing regulations to ensure that the 
licensing statutes cover all private police in the state while ensuring that 
local jurisdictions have the flexibility to implement additional regulations as 
they need. Specifically, the legislature should expand the law to cover all 
private police, whether they are employed by a private police company or 
by some other type of business, and should allow cities and counties to 
implement their own supplemental regulations. 
First, the legislature should expand the scope of the regulations to cover 
all private police forces. Currently, the state licensing requirements only 
apply to “third-party”185 private police—companies whose primary function 
is providing private policing.186 They do not apply to “internalized” private 
police—officers employed by a company, such as a shopping mall or retail 
establishment, that is not focused on providing private policing or security 
                                                 
183 See id. at 170–71 (arguing that private police companies, to a greater degree than the 
public police, are driven by profit maximization and client service). 
184 See, e.g., id. at 174; Joh, supra note 3, at 65–66. 
185 The distinction between “internalized” and “third-party” private police was adopted 
from Rushin, supra note 35, at 166. 
186 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020(1) (2015). 
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services but nonetheless employs private police to patrol the business or 
detain shoplifters.187 Broadening the scope of the regulation has two 
primary benefits. First, for the reasons outlined above, improving regulation 
of the private police industry as a whole is necessary to prevent abuses. 
Because internalized private police are more likely to make arrests, conduct 
searches, and carry weapons than third party private police,188 they should 
not be exempt from regulation. Second, preserving an exemption for 
internalized private police undermines the reforms outlined above. A 
customer seeking to skirt regulations could simply develop an internalized 
private police force rather than contracting with a third-party firm. Because 
companies with significant resources to develop internalized private police 
forces, such as shopping malls or large retail establishments, are likely to 
receive a high number of customers, this loophole has the potential to affect 
a large swath of the public.189 
Second, the legislature should allow cities and counties to implement 
their own supplemental regulations on private police conduct.190 Currently, 
local governments are prohibited from creating independent regulations on 
the conduct of private police.191 Permitting local governments to design and 
implement their own regulations to supplement the state regulations will be 
beneficial. For example, a jurisdiction may require additional training hours 
or may require training about a subject of local concern. Another may 
regulate what types of weapons private police can carry. An area with a 
                                                 
187 Id.  
188 Rushin, supra note 35, at 178–80. 
189 See also Abuses Against Workers Taint U.S. Meat and Poultry, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/24/abuses-against-workers-
taint-us-meat-and-poultry [https://perma.cc/2MBU-VJ2Z] (documenting a company’s 
internal police force using “trumped-up charges to arrest workers who were active union 
supporters”). 
190 Local governments should only be permitted to strengthen regulation of private police. 
Permitting them to weaken or otherwise avoid the state-level regulation would undermine 
the other reforms discussed in this article. 
191 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.140 (1991). 
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substantial Spanish-speaking population may require private police who 
carry guns to have enough familiarity with the language that they can 
interact safely with all residents. Successful regulations can serve as a 
model that other jurisdictions can choose to adopt in the future.192 
Additionally, preserving local flexibility will allow private police 
companies to best meet the needs of their customers and allow localities to 
best meet the needs of their residents. For example, a shopping mall in 
Spokane, a vineyard in Walla Walla, and a private marina in Seattle may 
have substantially different needs. Allowing local regulation may encourage 
jurisdictions to enact innovative regulations that can enhance public safety 
and serve as a model for others. 
B. Improve Transparency in the Private Police Industry 
The legislature should increase the transparency requirements for private 
police companies so that policymakers and the public have a better 
understanding of the ways in which private police operate. Over the last 
several decades, observers of the criminal justice system have come to 
understand the importance of collecting information on the practices of the 
public police.193 The result has been a wealth of data and both empirical and 
theoretical literature, which has helped guide efforts to reform public police 
practices.194 However, similar efforts have not been made with respect to 
the private police, and there is comparatively little knowledge about the 
                                                 
192 See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1168. (Noting that the decentralized regulatory structure 
that governs private police offers opportunities to test different models of policing 
regulation. For example, a jurisdiction may recognize a “right to police protection” and 
increase public police funding in order to eliminate the market for private police. See id. 
at 1170. Other possible avenues of private police reform include applying the 
exclusionary rule to improper searches conducted by the private police or further 
expanding tort liability. Id. at 1278.) Additionally, Chicago and the Bay Area have union-
organized private police with a detailed training regime. Boghosian, supra note 37, at 
183–84. 
193 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1276. 
194 Id. 
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activities of the private police.195 Increasing the amount of publicly-
available information about the practices of private police will help guide 
future regulatory or reform efforts. Specifically, private police companies 
should be required to provide public reporting regarding their interactions 
with citizens, private police contracts should be open to public scrutiny, and 
the legislature should fund empirical field studies of private police. 
Due to the secrecy of the private police industry, this information will 
likely not be made public voluntarily.196 Because private police firms are 
paid by their clients, and not by the public, they may be hesitant to report 
abuses for fear of losing business.197 Thus, legislative action is the only sure 
avenue to increased transparency in the private police industry. Specifically, 
the legislature should (1) require private police to produce publicly 
available reports about their interactions with citizens and to immediately 
report a use of force or discharge of a firearm to the public police, 
(2) facilitate transparency into private police contracts so the public knows 
who is paying the private police and what they are paid to do, and (3) fund 
empirical studies of the practices of the private police. 
1. Improve Repor ting Requirements 
Private police companies should be required to produce regular, public 
reports about their interactions with citizens and their uses of force. 
Currently, private police companies in Washington are only required to 
produce publicly-available reports in the case of the death or termination of 
private police officers, events that would disqualify a private police officer 
from holding a license, or a discharge of a firearm while on duty and 
outside of a shooting range.198 Private police companies should also be 
required to produce regular, publicly available reports on the number of 
                                                 
195 Id. at 1277. 
196 See, e.g., id. at 1278. 
197 Rahall, supra note 27, at 666. 
198 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.110 (2000). 
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people accosted or detained, when and how they were questioned, how 
many suspects were turned over to the public police, the number and type of 
searches conducted, and the circumstances and results of those searches. 
They should also be required to report on how often they use force and what 
sort of contact or weapon is used, and should be required to report on the 
race, gender, age, and other salient characteristics of the person accosted. 199 
Additionally, the legislature should tighten the existing reporting 
deadlines by requiring immediate reporting of any use of force or of a 
weapon. “Shooting incidents involving private police are underreported and 
under-investigated relative to those involving public police.”200 Currently, a 
private police company can wait up to 10 days before notifying local law 
enforcement of a discharge of a firearm by a private police officer.201 There 
is no requirement to report any other use of force by a private police officer. 
Private police companies should be required to immediately report any 
discharge of a firearm or use of force by a private police officer to local law 
enforcement.202 
2. Promote Contract Transparency 
Private police contracts should be subject to increased public scrutiny.203 
Because private police companies are paid by their clients, and not by the 
public, they have a powerful incentive to serve those clients at the expense 
                                                 
199 While these reports should be publicly available, they should take legitimate privacy 
interests into account. Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1279. 
200 Etzioni, supra note 22, at 298. 
201 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.110 (2000). 
202 Depending on the frequency of private police officers’ use of force, the legislature 
may want to consider mandating some sort of review of such incidents. For example, the 
legislature could task the local bodies that review public police use of force incidents to 
review private police incidents as well. 
203 Unlimited public access to private police contracts would likely raise valid privacy 
and business secrets concerns, so some redactions will likely be necessary. However, at a 
minimum, private police companies should be obligated to disclose who they are working 
for and any provisions relating to working with public police or enforcing the criminal 
law. 
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of the public.204 Private police companies should be required to disclose 
who their clients are and what services they are asked to perform. Are they 
instructed to remain unarmed or to carry weapons? What weapons do their 
contracts allow them to carry? Will they use any surveillance equipment, 
such as private drug-sniffing dogs? Are they obligated to report criminal 
activity to the police or are they instructed to take some sort of action to 
resolve it without involving the police? Are there any performance 
requirements, such as number of people stopped or number of reports to the 
public police, that officers are expected to meet? 
Transparency into who is paying the private police and what the private 
police are being paid to do will allow the public to better understand the 
costs imposed by private policing. The private police have powerful 
incentives to serve their clients, even if it comes at the expense of the 
public. To enable effective governance of the private police, the public 
should know what the private police are being paid to do it and who is 
paying them. 
Transparency into private police contracts may also deter inappropriate 
private police behavior. One private police firm has maintained quotas that 
its officers are expected to meet.205 A requirement that officers stop, 
question, or detain a certain number of citizens may encourage private 
police to target vulnerable members of society who are unable or unwilling 
to resist. There is evidence that people hire private police to target racial 
minorities in their communities.206 
3. Fund Empir ical Studies 
Finally, the legislature should fund empirical field studies of the private 
police to develop a more nuanced understanding of their practices and to 
                                                 
204 See Rushin, supra note 35, at 163. 
205 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 3, at 118–19 (noting one private police company that 
maintained quotas requiring officers to interrogate a certain number of shoplifting 
suspects).  
206 See Etzioni, supra note 22, at 299. 
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ensure that legal reforms result in changes in private police behavior.207 Due 
to the lack of federal or constitutional constraints on private police, private 
criminal procedure differs significantly from public criminal procedure.208 
Because front-line officers in the field wield a significant amount of 
discretion, studying internal processes and regulations is an inadequate 
substitute for monitoring behavior in the field.209 A detailed field study of 
the actual practices used by private police will help illustrate whether the 
proposed reforms are succeeding and will also illuminate further 
opportunities for reform.210 
C. Require More Rigorous Training 
The legislature should require that private police training is adequate to 
protect both the public and officers themselves. Due to the high turnover 
rates in the private police industry,211 proper training for new employees is 
particularly important. However, due to these high turnover rates, private 
police companies are hesitant to invest in training an employee who may 
only be around a short time.212 Currently, Washington requires no more 
than 16 hours of preliminary training and four hours of annual refresher 
training.213 While most states require just over eight hours of pre-
employment training on average, Washington lags significantly behind 
several states.214 California, Alaska, and Florida mandate forty hours of 
training before licensing.215 Other states, including Georgia, Illinois, 
Oklahoma, and Texas require twenty to thirty hours of pre-licensing 
                                                 
207 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1278–80. 
208 Id. at 1279 
209 Rushin, supra note 35, at 198. 
210 This type of empirical study will also provide importance context to efforts to reform 
the behavior of the public police. See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1279–80. 
211 Boghosian, supra note 37, at 179–80.  
212 Id. at 182–83.  
213 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.105 (2007).  
214 Rushin, supra note 35, at 191. 
215 Id.  
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training.216 Washington should, at a minimum, increase its training 
requirements to forty hours to keep pace with the states that are leading in 
this area and ensure that private police are trained in de-escalating conflicts 
and avoiding use of force.217 
Furthermore, the existing regulations contain only sparse details on what 
kind of training is required.218 In contrast, improved training of public 
police officers over the past several decades has resulted in increased 
professionalism and compliance with the law.219 Private police should be 
required to undergo training relating to use of force and de-escalation.220 
Private security guards have attributed excessive use of force against 
homeless people to inadequate training in interacting with those 
populations.221 Additionally, training in implicit racial and other bias may 
help reduce disparate treatment of vulnerable populations.222 
One of the primary benefits of increasing the transparency of private 
police practices is to illuminate areas where additional training is needed. 
However, the above suggestions are preliminary changes that the legislature 
can enact while additional information is gathered. 
                                                 
216 Id.  
217 Additional information about the private police industry, provided by the 
recommended transparency requirements, will help future policymakers determine the 
optimum amount and content of private police training. 
218 For example, “[n]o more than one hour per year of annual refresher training may focus 
directly on customer service-related skills or topics and the remaining three hours per 
year of annual refresher training must focus on emergency response concepts, skills, or 
topics including but not limited to knowledge of site post orders or life safety.” WASH. 
REV. CODE § 18.170.105(4) (2007). 
219 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 35, at 191–92. 
220 Private police training requirements should attempt to keep pace with the requirements 
for public police. A discrepancy between the two could undermine attempts to reduce use 
of force by public police by migrating the barred tactics to private police forces. See 
supra Part II.B.3. (Part II.B.3 explains that lax regulation of private police undermines 
efforts to regulate public police.) 
221 See Allen & Dungca, supra note 54. 
222 See Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t 
We All Just Get Along, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 376 (2015). 
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D. Improve Access to Remedies for People Harmed by Private Police 
The legislature should increase access to civil remedies to ensure that any 
person harmed by private police is able to receive adequate redress. While 
federal law provides a remedy for civil rights violations by the public 
police, no such remedy is available with respect to abuses by the private 
police.223 Furthermore, because interactions with the private police rarely 
result in arrest, courts rarely have a reason to review their practices.224 The 
legislature should create a civil right of action for people who are harmed 
by private police forces, guarantee minimum damages for plaintiffs who can 
show violations of constitutional norms, and increase the minimum 
insurance requirements for private police companies. 
The legislature should provide citizens with a right of action against 
private police for wrongful search, seizure, or use of force. People should be 
able to exercise this right of action in a forum, such as an administrative 
hearing, that is cheaper and more accessible to the general public than 
traditional civil litigation.225 While the high costs associated with civil 
litigation can deter citizens from assuring their rights, a cheaper option such 
as an administrative hearing will encourage aggrieved citizens to come 
forward.226 
Additionally, the legislature should impose minimum statutory damages 
for constitutional violations by private police, particularly those that result 
in a criminal conviction.227 If a plaintiff can show that a private police 
officer has done something that the state or federal constitutions bar a 
public police officer from doing, the law should set a minimum dollar figure 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The minimum recovery should be higher 
                                                 
223 See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1186–87 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows 
plaintiffs to recover damages and attorneys’ fees, generally does not apply to suits against 
the private police). 
224 See Joh, supra note 3, at 92. 
225 Rushin, supra note 35, at 198. 
226 Id.  
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if the violation results in a criminal conviction. Because the monetary cost 
of a constitutional violation, alone, is difficult to quantify, statutory 
minimum damages will likely facilitate civil suits because they will make a 
potential recovery more predictable. 
To ensure that private police companies have adequate resources to 
compensate anybody harmed, the legislature should raise the minimum 
level of insurance coverage that private police companies are required to 
hold. If, as it stands currently, a civil tort action is the primary vehicle by 
which an individual harmed by private police will receive redress, the 
insurance requirements must be high enough to cover any possible liability. 
The information currently available suggests that the existing 
requirements are much too low. Washington law requires private police 
companies to hold only $50,000 total general liability coverage.228 In 
contrast, to receive a permit for a public fireworks display, an applicant 
must have at least $75,000 of insurance coverage for each event.229 A 
fishing guide must hold $300,000 of coverage.230 As private policing—and 
particularly armed private policing—may pose a risk to public safety, 
private police companies should be required to hold equivalent amounts of 
insurance coverage.231  
Washington’s requirement is inadequate to ensure compensation for 
people harmed by private police, particularly if there are serious injuries. 
After the Westlake Center pepper spray incident, the victim’s attorney 
estimated the potential damages at $450,000.232 In another incident, the 
actions of an off-duty public police officer working as a private police 
                                                 
228 This includes $25,000 for personal injury and $25,000 for property damage. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 18.170.080 (1991). 
229 WASH. REV. CODE § 70.77.295 (1984). 
230 WASH. REV. CODE § 77.65.560 (1)(d) (2015). 
231 Cf. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1339 (2017) (discussing the ways in which insurers regulate the behavior of public 
police).  
232 Herz, supra note 19 (noting that the plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter requesting 
$450,000). 
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officer resulted in the death of a minor and total liability of over $1.5 
million.233 Collecting information on private police practices, particularly 
use of force, will enable the legislature to determine the appropriate level of 
insurance coverage to ensure that any person harmed by a private police 
company is able to receive appropriate compensation.  
Creating a right of action in an administrative forum, guaranteeing 
minimum damages for Constitutional violations, and requiring more robust 
insurance coverage will facilitate civil suits against the private police when 
they violate peoples’ rights. Such legal action will help prevent 
inappropriate private police behavior. Because private police companies are 
motivated by profit, the risk of monetary penalties creates a strong incentive 
to prevent abuses by private police. 
E. Responses to Criticisms 
The legislative reforms proposed will likely attract opposition, 
particularly from private police companies and from private police 
customers who fear increased prices or lower-quality service. The following 
section will address four possible criticisms: (1) the reforms are 
unnecessary because the private police can regulate themselves, (2) the 
reforms are unnecessary because the threat of criminal prosecution will 
deter misconduct, (3) the reforms will undermine the viability of the private 
police industry, and (4) without private police services, people may turn to 
vigilante activity. This section will conclude by addressing a common 
competing reform proposal: treating private police as state actors. 
1. State Regulation is Necessary; Voluntary Self-Regulation by the 
Pr ivate Police Industry is Inadequate 
Private police companies will likely argue that this proposal is 
unnecessary because they can adequately regulate themselves without 
government interference. They will point to studies sponsored by the 
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Department of Justice that have recommended that private police firms 
adopt and enforce voluntary guidelines.234 British private police companies 
have implemented “industry-imposed” regulations.235 Critics will argue that 
the profit motive and the need to provide quality service to customers will 
ensure that private police officers are well-trained, their backgrounds are 
checked, and they perform their jobs safely. Furthermore, because their 
actions can expose their clients to liability, the private police will have a 
financial incentive to avoid any abusive behavior.236 
However, voluntary codes of conduct and the profit motive alone will not 
ensure adequate regulation of the private police; new legislation is needed 
to govern the conduct of private police. The examples of private police 
abuses identified earlier in the article provide evidence that private police 
companies are unable to adequately regulate their conduct. Furthermore, 
studies of the British regulatory scheme, which has been touted as a model 
for American companies to emulate, showed it to be entirely ineffective.237 
Information disclosures, such as those suggested above, would be 
necessary to verify the success of any scheme of self-regulation. 
Furthermore, price competition among private police firms creates a 
powerful incentive to reduce expenses on things like wages, training, and 
background checks.238 An effective scheme of self-regulation would require 
universal cooperation and a willingness to embrace higher prices or lower 
profits, both of which seem unlikely. Self-regulation is likely to be, at best, 
a supplement to regulation by the state.239 
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238 See Boghosian, supra note 37, at 177; Sklansky, supra note 3, at 1279. 
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2. The Threat of Cr iminal Prosecution Will Not Prevent Pr ivate Police 
Misconduct 
Private police companies might also argue that legislation is unnecessary 
because the threat of criminal prosecution will deter the private police from 
harming people. However, the risk that abusive conduct will result in a 
criminal prosecution is an insufficient check on the actions of private 
police. The story of the private police officer in Part I, supra, provides 
anecdotal evidence of this. When the officer’s felony conviction prevented 
him from seeking employment, he convinced a court to vacate it and 
received his license as a private police officer three years later.240 He was 
hired as a private police officer, despite a criminal record showing negligent 
driving, unlawful discharge of a firearm, violation of a no-contact order, 
and forgery.241 The officer’s 2014 arrest and charges of fourth-degree 
assault for pepper-spraying two teenagers, while employed at a different 
private police firm, did not prevent CP from hiring him.242 In Washington, 
not a single private police officer has been disciplined by the state 
Department of Licensing since 2007.243 
One observer has noted that, empirically, criminal prosecutions of the 
private police “appear virtually nonexistent,”244 but the proposed reforms 
may encourage prosecution for abuses by the private police. Because 
private police interactions rarely result in arrest, courts are rarely able to 
review the practices of the private police.245 Current Washington law 
facilitates unpunished private police abuses: there is no requirement that 
                                                 
240 Barnett, supra note 15. 
241 Id. 
242 Grande, supra note 18.  
243 Herz, supra note 19 (statistic as of 2014).  
244 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1186. Because police and prosecutors can benefit from the 
actions of private police, they have an incentive not to arrest or pursue charges against 
private police. 
245 Joh, supra note 3, at 92 (noting that absent an arrest, courts rarely have occasion to 
review police conduct), 79 (citing anecdotal evidence suggesting that private police 
arrests are rare). 
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private police companies report a use of force to law enforcement. Private 
police companies have no incentive to expose themselves to liability by 
doing so. Thus, it is likely that private police use of force will only be 
investigated if a victim or third party reports it. However, victims and 
bystanders may have an incentive not to report abuses if they have been 
engaged in criminal activity or fear interacting with the public police. The 
proposed legislation would require private police forces to immediately 
report any discharge of a firearm or use of force. This requirement would 
enable the public police to investigate these incidents before any evidence is 
lost. 
3. Legislation Will Not Under mine the Effectiveness of Pr ivate Police 
Officers or  the Viability of the Pr ivate Police Industry 
Private police companies and their supporters may argue that the 
recommended legislation will impede the effectiveness of private police and 
may threaten the viability of the private police industry. A group of Seattle 
residents noted that one of the benefits of the private police is that they are 
willing to “perform many tasks that would be considered ‘beneath’ most 
beat cops.”246 In this view, the lax regulatory environment that private 
police operate in is essential, as it enables them to respond to events more 
flexibly than the public police. 
However, improving regulation of the private police will not undermine 
their effectiveness and may help the industry better serve its customers.247 
Improved training requirements will make the private police better at their 
jobs. Some private police have reported feeling “unprepared and anxious 
                                                 
246 Private Security vs Public Law Enforcement, MAGNOLIA PATROL ASSOCIATION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304231751/http://www.magnoliapatrol.org/private-
security-vs-public-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/7FTP-Q4DR] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2017). 
247WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.150 (Because Washington law requires any out-of-state 
private security guards working in Washington to meet the same training, insurance, and 
certification requirements as guards licensed in Washington, there is no risk that the 
proposed reforms would benefit out-of-state companies over Washington companies.). 
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about how they would handle certain situations if they arose.”248 Other 
private police have reported they do not receive self-defense training they 
need to protect themselves.249 While the country’s largest membership 
group for private police, the International Foundation for Protection 
Officers, has recommended increased training standards, no state comes 
close to meeting the recommendations.250 Private police personnel have said 
that the lack of training results in excessive use of force.251 Thus, improving 
the training that private police receive will help protect both the public and 
the private police officers themselves. 
4. Improving Regulation of Pr ivate Police Will Not Provoke a Backlash 
by Vigilante Groups 
Opponents of the proposed reforms may argue that it will make the 
public less safe by spurring vigilante movements. If the private police are 
no longer able to provide the aggressive tactics that residents want, 
residents may take matters into their own hands. Because vigilante groups 
are entirely untrained and unregulated, they may be more likely to infringe 
peoples’ rights or injure people. Fears of a citizen backlash are not 
unfounded; when a California state court held that the exclusionary rule 
applied to the private police, the decision was overturned by a state 
referendum.252 In Seattle, there have been complaints of vigilante groups 
with dogs intimidating residents of the Columbia City neighborhood.253 
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However, the risks posed by private police are greater than those posed 
by vigilante groups. Even though they have the same legal authority as 
ordinary people, private police are “occupationally disposed to use powers 
that a citizen may rarely, if ever, invoke.”254 
In addition, private police are more likely than vigilante groups to be 
mistaken for public police. Private police uniforms are frequently designed 
to mimic those of the public police.255 This similarity causes confusion 
because an observer may mistakenly believe that a private police officer is 
actually a public police officer vested with legal authority.256 This confusion 
increases the risk of infringing on peoples’ rights; people may mistakenly 
believe that they are legally obligated to submit to a search or detention by 
private police. In contrast, citizen patrols or vigilante groups are unlikely to 
be perceived as possessing legal authority because they do not wear official-
looking uniforms. 
Finally, existing state law likely prohibits the formation of vigilante 
groups. It is a gross misdemeanor for any person to perform the “functions 
and duties” of a private police officer without a license.257 
5. The Proposed Reforms Are a Better  Solution Than Expanding the 
State Actor  Doctr ine to Cover  Pr ivate Police 
Several observers have argued that private police should be treated as 
state actors.258 If courts or legislatures were to classify the private police as 
state actors, they would become subject to constitutional constraints, such 
as the exclusionary rule and the requirement to provide Miranda warnings. 
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This alternative strategy for improving the regulation of the private police 
may make the proposed legislation unnecessary. 
However, the legislative reforms advocated in this article are a superior 
means of regulating the private police. Expanding the state actor doctrine 
will not actually deter abuses by the private police. The primary 
consequence259 of an illegal search or seizure by a state actor is that any 
evidence obtained will be excluded from a criminal trial.260 This deters 
public police from conducting illegal searches because it makes it more 
difficult to obtain a criminal conviction. However, unlike the public police, 
many private police are not concerned with enforcing the criminal law or 
obtaining a criminal conviction.261 Thus, expanding the state actor doctrine 
is unlikely to be a sufficient check on the behavior of private police. 
Because they are motivated by profit, not criminal convictions, the 
proposed legislative reforms are necessary to ensure that the public is 
protected from abuses by the private police. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lax regulation of the private police poses significant risks to public 
safety and encourages private police to violate constitutional norms with 
impunity. The stories of police abuses in Magnolia and at Westlake Center 
Mall demonstrate that these fears are not merely hypothetical; interacting 
with loosely-regulated private police places Washington residents at risk. 
Existing regulations are inadequate to protect the public. Because they 
are not state actors, the constraints that the U.S. Constitution places on the 
public police do not apply to the private police. Thus, legal protections that 
the general public may be familiar with—the prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, Miranda warnings, or the exclusionary 
                                                 
259 Violating a person’s constitutional rights also subjects a state actor to a civil lawsuit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, these suits are often costly and difficult to bring, 
making them an insufficient check on abusive behavior. See supra Part III.B.4.  
260 See Beaton, supra note 38, at 615. 
261 Rushin, supra note 35, at 197; Joh, supra note 3, at 118. 
Cops for Hire... 605 
VOLUME 16 • ISSUE 2 • 2017 
rule—do not govern interactions with the private police. However, because 
the private police’s dress and demeanor attempt to mimic that of the public 
police, the public may not realize the difference. Though the private police 
have no more legal authority than an ordinary person, the public may 
mistakenly believe they act with state authority. An individual who submits 
to a search or interrogation by a private police officer may see the evidence 
gathered passed along to the public police. This may result in a criminal 
conviction, even if the exact same search would have been illegal if 
conducted by the public police. 
Washington’s current regulatory structure is inadequate to combat this 
problem. Washington courts do not consider the private police to be state 
actors; thus, the behavior of the private police is not constrained by the state 
or federal constitution. Washington’s licensing scheme, which serves as the 
primary source of regulatory authority, must be improved. It exempts 
private police who do not work for a private police company from its 
requirements and it prohibits local jurisdictions from enacting additional 
regulations to protect their residents. The legislature must enact new 
legislation to improve regulation of the private police. These reforms should 
include improving transparency in the private police industry, improving 
training requirements for private police, and facilitating redress for people 
who are harmed by private police. 
These reforms will help protect the public from abuses by private police. 
The requirement to immediately report a use of force or discharge of a 
firearm will enable the public police to investigate abusive private police 
behavior. Transparency into the private police industry will enable future 
policymakers to design additional appropriate regulations. Improved 
training will enable the private police to interact safely with the public. If, 
despite these reforms, an individual is harmed by inappropriate private 
police conduct, improved access to remedies will help them receive 
appropriate redress. Finally, these reforms will help ensure the integrity of 
efforts to reform the public police, such as the City of Seattle’s consent 
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decree with the Department of Justice, by preventing abusive tactics from 
simply migrating from the public to the private police. The proposed 
legislation will enable the private police to serve their clients’ needs while 
maintaining public safety and strengthening constitutional norms. 
